Although financial risk measurement is a largely investigated research area, its relationship with imprecise probabilities has been mostly overlooked. However, risk measures can be viewed as instances of upper (or lower) previsions, thus letting us apply the theory of imprecise previsions to them. After a presentation of some well known risk measures, including Value-at-Risk or VaR, coherent and convex risk measures, we show how their definitions can be generalized and discuss their consistency properties. Thus, for instance, VaR may or may not avoid sure loss, and conditions for this can be derived. This analysis also makes us consider a very large class of imprecise previsions, which we termed convex previsions, generalizing convex risk measures. Shortfall-based measures and Dutch risk measures are also investigated. Further, conditional risks can be measured by introducing conditional convex previsions. Finally, we analyze the role in risk measurement of some important notions in the theory of imprecise probabilities, like the natural extension or the envelope theorems.
Introduction
Early motivations for introducing imprecise probabilities were related to problems of eliciting beliefs, especially under scarce or not quite reliable prior information, or to statistical robustness questions. Many other applications and connections with various theories have been explored subsequently. The term 'imprecise probabilities' itself includes a number of theories, like belief functions, possibility theory, and (which matters here) imprecise previsions. It is rather difficult however to find references to imprecise probabilities in the quite large literature on financial risk measurement, even though a reader acquainted with imprecise probability theory will occasionally find some analogies. The main purpose of this paper, which is a revised and extended version of [26] , is to illustrate how deeply imprecise previsions may fit risk measurement problems. This analysis was performed in [19] [20] [21] [22] , where additional results and most proofs may be found; proofs are supplied here for the new material in Sections 5.4 and 5.5. The paper is primarily addressed to potential readers with some knowledge of imprecise probabilities, but little or possibly no information about risk measurement. Therefore, Section 2 supplies some basic notions on risk measures, as they may be found in the literature, while Section 3 recalls, more concisely, notions about imprecise previsions. Some relevant concepts are defined or interpreted in different ways in the literature: we describe shortly the point of view followed in this paper in Section 2.1. The connection between imprecise previsions and risk measures is stressed in Section 4,  showing that a risk measure may be viewed as an upper prevision. This lets us apply to risk measures the consistency notions developed for imprecise previsions, of coherence, of avoiding sure loss, and the somehow intermediate concept of (centered) convex prevision. We discuss various risk measures from this perspective in Section 5, while Section 6 is concerned with applying other basic concepts from imprecise prevision theory to risk measurement. The interesting but more complex issue of measuring conditional risks is presented at an introductory level in Section 5.6 and in some parts of Section 6. Notes on references may be found in the concluding Section 7.
Risk measurement without imprecise probabilities
A basic problem in financial risk measurement is that of stating how risky a given random variable X is. In practice X will be (the value in some currency of) a certain bond, a share, an index, a portfolio (i.e. a set of financial assets held by an individual or an institution) or a subportfolio (a subset of a portfolio meeting certain requirements, like the set of all options, the set of all bonds issued by a certain bank, or others), the amount of a company's insurance claims at a given date, and so on.
Although various instruments can theoretically be employed to tackle this problem, for instance loss functions, practitioners tend to favour risk measures, also because of their conceptual simplicity. In fact, the risk measure qðX Þ for X is just a real number which should summarize the evaluation about the riskiness of X. It has a direct operational interpretation: when positive, it should measure the risk capital which the owner of X should allocate to face possible losses arising from X (cf., for instance, [9] , Definition 2.2.1). Practitioners are often even more cautious: the level of the reserve funds covering risks related to portfolios of banks and other companies is determined (daily or weekly) as a multiple (for instance, two or three) of some risk measure. When negative, qðX Þ represents the amount of money which could be subtracted from X, keeping the resulting random variable acceptable, or in other words desirable.
More generally, one might consider an arbitrary set D of random variables, and associate a real number qðX Þ to each of them. The risk measure q is then a real function with domain D.
The outcome of each X in D will usually be determined only at a certain future time t X (generally random, but we assume it is non-random here), while qðX Þ represents an amount of money to be reserved immediately. This time gap makes the quantities X ; qðX Þ financially not comparable: if, say, t X is the end of next year, we should determine to ensure comparability what is today's worth of getting X only at t X . This worth is termed the discounted value of X, and may be computed multiplying X by a discounting factor r 6 1 (quite often r is obtained from the interest rate of 'risk-free' bonds, typically government bonds). To make things simpler, we assume r ¼ 1. This is not restrictive for the coming theory, and corresponds to a situation where the gap between the evaluation time and t X is negligible, or when the discounting factor is anyway close to 1.
Clearly, the problem of choosing a risk measure is a delicate one, and it seems difficult to find proposals free of any shortcoming and criticism. We present here some solutions, among those currently most used or investigated, but will not include other important kinds of risk measures (cf. Section 7).
Probably, Value-at-Risk or VaR is nowadays the most widespread risk measure. Following [2] , it is defined in this way: Definition 1. Let X be a random variable, whose probability distribution is P. The number q is an a-quantile for X if P ðX < qÞ 6 a 6 P ðX 6 qÞ:
Define then
Hence, VaR a is a quantile-based measure. As such, a sufficiently reliable estimate of the distribution function of any X in D must be available to use it, and this may already be difficult in certain situations.
Criticism on VaR focused also on other points:
(a) VaR is nearly uninformative about the values of X smaller than the threshold q þ a , only letting us know that as a whole their probability is bounded above by the chosen a. In particular, it tells us nothing about the maximum loss that X may cause. Clearly, given P, we obtain more cautious risk evaluations from VaR a by lowering a, so a is usually fixed a priori at a level considered sufficiently low, for instance a ¼ 0:01. (b) VaR is not necessarily subadditive, i.e. there exist some D and
Subadditivity is often a desirable property: for instance, a firm willing to reserve as little money as possible to cover its portfolio risks and adopting a non-subadditive risk measure might find it useful to split, possibly artificially, its portfolio into two or more subportfolios. Another strong argument is that the risk of the sum should be not greater than the sum of the risks, because of diversification of investments.
Recently, a new family of risk measures was introduced as an alternative to VaR in a series of papers (among these, [1, 2, 5] ) by Artzner, Delbaen, Eber and Heath. We call these measures ADEH-coherent risk measures here. Artzner et al. simply named them coherent risk measures, and as such they are referred to in the literature, but to prevent potential misunderstandings we reserve the phrasing coherent risk measure for a generalization of theirs, presented in Sections 4 and 5.1. ADEH-coherent risk measures were defined by a set of axioms on a linear space. In the version of [2] , the definition is: Definition 2. Let L be a linear space of (bounded) random variables which contains real constants. A mapping q from L into R is an ADEH-coherent risk measure iff it satisfies the following axioms:
Actually, all X in L are simple (i.e. they may assume only finitely many distinct values) in Ref. [2] , but this requirement is inessential for the sequel and is dropped here, while keeping on considering bounded random variables.
ADEH-coherent risk measures are subadditive, and also positively homogeneous. Axiom (PH) has been considered the least convincing one in Definition 2. In fact, it could reasonably be qðkX Þ > kqðX Þ, for some k > 1: holding very large amounts of a financial investment might be disproportionately more risky than holding a more limited quantity, for various reasons, including liquidity risks (we might be forced to allow a significant discount to the buyer(s) when wishing to sell quickly large quantities of a certain investment).
Also for these reasons, a generalization of the notion of ADEH-coherent risk measure was suggested by Fö llmer and Schied [10, 11] . They substituted axioms (S) and (PH) in Definition 2 with a convexity axiom as follows: Definition 3. Let L be a linear space of (bounded) random variables which contains real constants. A mapping q from L into R is a FS-convex risk measure iff it satisfies axioms (T), (M) (cf. Definition 2) and the convexity axiom:
Much like ADEH-coherent risk measures, we use the term FS-convex risk measure here instead of the commonly adopted one, i.e. convex risk measure, to point out the distinction between FS-convex risk measures and a generalization of theirs, discussed in Section 5.3.
FS-convex risk measures are therefore not necessarily either positively homogeneous or subadditive. Although subadditivity and lack of positive homogeneity are both reasonable properties for a risk measure, recall that they are incompatible in most non-trivial situations: an agent must establish, here and in other similar problems, which facet of riskiness should be prevailing in his framework. In general, the choice depends also on the agent's role. For an example, suppose X is the whole portfolio of a joint-stock company. The agent might be a shareholder, the company management, some regulatory authority, a potential buyer, etc. Evaluations about maximum losses (bullet (a) above) or losses not covered by a given risk measure (cf. Section 5.4) will be generally less important to shareholders (which are basically liability-free and concerned with their investment return) than to company managers or regulators. On their turn, the latter two categories have different motivations: company managers are aware that reserving enough capital to face risks improves the company's rating and hence lowers borrowing costs, but this policy often has to take account of the shareholders' pressure for higher pay-offs, while a regulator wishes to prevent socially relevant critical situations. The regulator's aims may also suggest replacing subadditivity with some weaker condition for the risk measures adopted by regulatory authorities, as discussed in [7] . These remarks are just an instance of the kind of difficulties one meets in selecting a specific risk measure.
We shall reconsider the measures described here in Section 5.
A note on definitions, random variables and conditioning
In risk management literature, the same name is often given to different entities, although the ideas underlying alternative definitions are similar. This is true for VaR and even more for shortfall-based measures (Section 5.4). Further, reasoning in terms of losses is sometimes preferred [6] , evaluating hence ÀX instead of X and assuming that X 6 0. This is in general restrictive, but makes sense in some important applications, for instance when X represents random claims to be paid by an insurer.
In this paper, a (bounded) random variable (also called gamble [27] or random quantity [8] ) is represented by a mapping from a partition P into the real line, 1 x : P7 !R. The partition must adequately describe the possible values of X, but need not be unique. For instance, suppose X may only have values À2 and 1. We can choose P ¼ fX ¼ À1; X ¼ 2g which makes x injective, and x obviously assigns i to the event X ¼ i, but any partition P 0 more refined than P may also be appropriate to describe the same X by means of a formally different mapping x 0 : P 0 7 !R, which has the same image as x (the mappings x, x 0 are equivalent; cf. [4] , where a formal treatment may be found). If more random variables are considered at the same time, we need a partition large enough to jointly describe them all (like partition P in Proposition 2). In classical probability theory this partition is regarded as fixed (and called X), but this is not necessary in general, and not even here (cf. the discussion in [27] , Section 2.1.4).
An important consequence of this approach is that a random variable may be defined without assessing any probability measure: we might for instance elicit comparative judgements only, like 'X is more likely to be positive than negative'. Consider further Definition 2: in itself, it does not require assessing any probability distribution before evaluating X through qðX Þ. Thus X may be defined independently of the problem of how to evaluate it.
When conditioning on some non-impossible event B, we may represent the conditional random variable X jB analogously, without introducing any uncertainty measure. If X is represented by x : P7 !R, X jB is represented by x B : PjB7 !R, where the elements of the conditional partition PjB are obtained by replacing each x 2 P with the conditional event xjB. The domain of x B is made up of those xjB which are non-impossible (i.e., such that assuming that B is true does not imply that x is false).
Precise and imprecise previsions
As we have seen, the number qðX Þ should summarize the riskiness of X. Precise and imprecise previsions for X are other numbers synthesizing X, and are related to qðX Þ.
A (precise) prevision P ðX Þ is a fair value for X, that is a real number an agent would consider fair to exchange for either buying or selling the random variable X. More generally, sP ðX Þ; s 2 R is exchanged with sX (the agent buys sX, and bets in favour of X, when s > 0, sells sX and bets against X when s < 0) [8] . In de Finetti's approach, coherent previsions are defined as follows:
Definition 4. Given a set D of (bounded) random variables, a mapping P : D 7 ! R is a coherent prevision on D iff, for all n 2 N, for each X 1 ; . . . ; X n 2 D, for each real s 1 ; . . . ; s n , defining G ¼ P n i¼1 s i Á ðX i À P ðX i ÞÞ, it holds that sup G P 0.
In a betting interpretation, a coherent prevision is such that no finite combination of bets is possible that originates an overall gain which is negative and bounded away from 0 ðs i Á ðX i À P ðX i ÞÞ is the gain on the ith bet, that on X i ).
The (precise) previsions considered in the rest of this paper will be understood to be coherent. The concept in Definition 4 is closely related to that of expectation: whenever X is bounded and its expectation EðX Þ is given, then EðX Þ is its coherent prevision. An interesting practical difference between these two concepts is that assessing a prevision for X does not require preliminarily evaluating any distribution function for X, and in this sense the notion of prevision is more general.
The following necessary conditions for coherence may be derived from Definition 4 and will be used in the sequel:
We stress that, by Definition 4, previsions may be defined on any set D of random variables. A well known extension theorem guarantees that a coherent prevision may always be extended to any D 0 ' D, in such a way that the (generally not unique) extension is coherent on D 0 . If we are unable to reliably assess P ðX Þ, we may wish to assess a lower or an upper prevision, P ðX Þ and P ðX Þ, respectively. Each of P ðX Þ; P ðX Þ is an imprecise prevision for X. A precise prevision is the special case P ðX Þ ¼ P ðX Þ ¼ P ðX Þ. Imprecise previsions were studied extensively in [27] , giving also betting interpretations and consistency notions for them. In particular, the customary consistency requirement for imprecise evaluations is coherence, which is anyway weaker than coherence for precise previsions, while a still weaker notion is that of avoiding sure loss. The definitions of these consistency notions are formally similar to Definition 4, and may be obtained from it by introducing sign constraints to the numbers s 1 ; . . . ; s n . In the behavioural interpretation, this means that the agent's prices are no longer necessarily fair, as his willingness to buy (sell) X does not necessarily imply his willingness to sell (buy) it. Consequently upper and lower previsions correspond no longer to fair prices, but in general only to selling and buying prices, respectively.
For instance, an upper prevision P : D7 !R avoids sure loss on D iff for all n 2 N, for each X 1 ; . . . ; X n 2 D, for each s 1 ; . . . ; s n real and non-negative, defining G ¼ P n i¼1 s i Á ðP ðX i Þ À X i Þ, we have that sup G P 0. A characterization theorem (or envelope theorem, cf. [27] , Section 3.3.3(a)) ensures that P avoids sure loss on D if and only if there exists a coherent (precise) prevision P on D, such that P ðX Þ P P ðX Þ; 8X 2 D.
The above concepts of coherent precise or imprecise prevision can be generalized to a conditional environment (cf. [14, 27, 28, 30] ).
Risk measures as imprecise previsions
When having to assess qðX Þ, an agent might identify it with the infimum of the amounts that he would ask to shoulder X. Clearly, the more X is risky the higher qðX Þ should be. Since getting a specific amount for receiving X is the same as selling ÀX for the same amount, qðX Þ can be equivalently viewed as an infimum selling price for ÀX.
Note that in this interpretation, suggested in [19] , the agent's action of buying or selling whatever amount is considered in the abstract, in order to better elicit his beliefs. It is therefore not relevant at this stage whether the agent materially has the possibility of concluding the buying/selling operations he imagines.
Regarding qðX Þ as an infimum selling price for ÀX is equivalent to adopting the behavioural interpretation given in [27] for the upper prevision P of ÀX, or also for the opposite of the lower prevision P for X, given the conjugacy relation
between upper and lower previsions [27] . Therefore, we have
From (7), results from the theory of imprecise probabilities can be applied to risk measures. Thus, recalling (7) and referring to upper previsions to make comparisons with pre-existing concepts simpler, 2 the following definition may be given [19] :
Definition 5. Given an arbitrary set D of random variables, a mapping q : D7 !R is a coherent risk measure on D iff there exists a coherent upper prevision P defined on D Ã ¼ fÀX : X 2 Dg such that qðX Þ ¼ P ðÀX Þ. Similarly, q avoids sure loss on D iff there is an upper prevision P that avoids sure loss on D Ã , such that qðX Þ ¼ P ðÀX Þ.
Finally, note that the correspondence between risk measures and (conditional) imprecise previsions still holds when considering a conditional random variable X jB (replace X with X jB in (6) and (7)). The argument goes along as in the unconditional case, recalling that the buying/selling operations are now considered only when B is true (we may buy/sell X contingent on B: the transaction is called off unless B occurs).
Consistency of risk measures
Having established the connection between risk measures and imprecise previsions summarised in (7), it is natural to reinterpret existing risk measures in the framework of imprecise probability theory.
The first step consists of applying the well known consistency notions developed in [27] to them. So the first question is: is a given risk measure coherent, or does it at least avoid sure loss?
Coherent risk measures
These matters were investigated in [19] for the case of ADEH-coherent risk measures and VaR. It was proved in [19] that: Proposition 1. When D is a linear space of random variables which contains real constants, a mapping q from D into R is an ADEH-coherent risk measure (Definition 2) if and only if it is a coherent risk measure (Definition 5).
We may therefore conclude that ADEH-coherent risk measures are actually a special case of coherent imprecise prevision. Note that Definition 5 is more general than Definition 2, since it operates on any (non-empty) set D. On the contrary, a risk measure which satisfies all axioms in Definition 2 on a set D which is not a linear space is not necessarily coherent.
For instance, when D ¼ fX g, qðX Þ > supðÀX Þ ¼ À infðX Þ satisfies trivially all axioms but is not coherent on D, since it corresponds to P ðÀX Þ > supðÀX Þ, an inequality which violates a necessary condition for coherence (internality, cf. [27] ). Inconsistency of q is patent here also recalling the operational interpretation of risk measures: the inequality qðX Þ > À infðX Þ would imply adding to X, to obtain an acceptable risk, more than the maximum loss X may cause.
Value-at-Risk
The consistency properties of VaR are less clear-cut. Examples may be found where VaR a is coherent, but VaR a does not even avoid sure loss in other instances [19] .
It is possible to derive conditions which are either necessary or sufficient for VaR to avoid sure loss or to be coherent. We report one such condition [19] : Proposition 2. Let D ¼ fX i g i2I be a family of arbitrary (bounded) random variables, P a partition whose atoms describe all values for X i , i 2 I, which are jointly possible (cf. Section 2.1) and P a probability distribution on P. Assign a 2 ð0; 1Þ.
If, for some x 2 P, condition
holds, then VaR a avoids sure loss on D.
It can be seen that Proposition 2 holds in several practical circumstances, whilst it is considerably more difficult to comply with sufficient conditions for coherence. An important aspect of all these conditions is that they tend to be verified when a is sufficiently low. However, this is operationally of little use, because:
• a is generally fixed a priori, having the meaning of an assigned confidence level;
• when lowering a, VaR a tends to increase. If a approaches 0 from above, VaR a gets close to À infðX Þ from below. But À infðX Þ is too extreme a value for a risk capital (it would certainly cover all losses possibly arising from X, but requiring too much reserve money).
The overall evaluation of VaR as an imprecise prevision is therefore that it is generally not sufficiently dependable.
Convex risk measures
The case of FS-convex risk measures is rather interesting. In fact, they are seemingly close to ADEHcoherent risk measures. Hence one might wonder, following closely the framework in [27] , whether some consistency notion can be found in the theory of imprecise previsions, which corresponds to FS-convex risk measures.
The question was tackled in [20] (with further developments in [21] ), where the following notion of consistency for lower previsions, called convexity, was introduced: Definition 6. A mapping P : D7 !R is a convex lower prevision on D iff, for all n 2 N þ , for each X 0 ; X 1 ; . . . ; X n 2 D, for each s 1 ; . . . ; s n real and non-negative such that P n i¼1 s i ¼ 1 (convexity condition), if we define G ¼ P n i¼1 s i Á ðX i À P ðX i ÞÞ À ðX 0 À P ðX 0 ÞÞ, then sup G P 0. Formally, Definition 6 differs from the definition of coherent lower prevision in [27] , Section 2.5.4(a), only because of the additional convexity condition P n i¼1 s i ¼ 1. Therefore, every coherent lower prevision is also convex, whilst it was proven in [20] 
Further, it can be shown that if P is a convex prevision and P ð0Þ P 0, then (whenever the relevant random variables are in D) 8X 2 D; P ðkX Þ P kP ðX Þ; 8k 2 ½0; 1; P ðkX Þ 6 kP ðX Þ; 8k > 1 ð9Þ
whilst the above inequalities do not necessarily hold when P ð0Þ < 0 ( [21] , Section 3.1).
Noting that it seems unreasonable in most cases to assign P ð0Þ 6 ¼ 0, a special subclass of convex previsions is singled out: Definition 7. A lower prevision P on Dð0 2 DÞ is a centered convex prevision (C-convex prevision, in short) iff it is convex and P ð0Þ ¼ 0.
C-convex lower previsions have several nice properties, and are formally a special class of previsions which avoid sure loss but are not necessarily coherent. They are not necessarily positively homogeneous, and (9) holds for them (but not, in general, for convex previsions, as already recalled).
Their introduction gives some answers to a broader problem than that of looking for correspondences with FS-convex risk measures. Precisely it tackles the question of detecting, among previsions that avoid sure loss, subclasses with relevant theoretical and operational properties. For a behavioural interpretation of C-convex risk measures, see [20] , Section 3.2.
Let us return to the relationship with FS-convex risk measures. The following definition was proposed in [20] 
Recalling (7) and Definition 6, it is easy to realize that Definition 8 is precisely the definition of convexity for lower previsions, applied to qðX Þ ¼ ÀP ðX Þ.
The following characterization theorem holds for convex lower previsions [20] :
Theorem 1. Let L be a linear space of bounded random variables containing real constants. A mapping P : L7 !R is a convex lower prevision on L iff it satisfies the following axioms:
It is not difficult then to realize that:
Theorem 2. If D is a linear space of bounded random variables containing real constants, a mapping q from D into R is a FS-convex risk measure (Definition 3) iff it is a convex risk measure (Definition 8).
Hence we obtain the traditional definition of FS-convex risk measure as a special case of Definition 8. Again, when D is arbitrary verifying the axioms for FS-convex risk measures does not indeed guarantee convexity in the sense of Definition 8. Further, a FS-convex risk measure is not necessarily centered, a feature which might be hard to justify in many practical situations. Therefore, the notion of centered convex risk measure in Definition 8 seems appropriate to express lack of positive homogeneity on arbitrary sets of random variables. It clearly allows more flexibility than coherent risk measures. To give an idea of this, let D ¼ fkX : k P 0g (this example is discussed extensively in [20] ). It is easily seen that any coherent risk measure q on D is a linear function of k : qðkX Þ ¼ kqðX Þ, with qð0Þ ¼ 0. In other words, q is confined to a precise prevision. C-convex risk measures permit eliciting more various beliefs. For instance, the function
, is a C-convex risk measure. It fits the case of an abrupt change, here conventionally corresponding to k ¼ 1, in the agent's risk attitude as k increases.
Shortfall-based risk measures
Various other risk measures have been proposed in risk literature and practice. Some of them will be considered here, often in more general versions involving previsions, and with an eye to their consistency properties as imprecise previsions.
Reserving a capital qðX Þ < À infðX Þ to face potential losses from X may turn out to be not enough once the exact value X ðxÞ is known. For instance, if q ¼ 4 and X ðxÞ ¼ À10, there is a residual loss of 6, in absolute value, not covered by q. This is the shortfall amount in this case.
In general, the shortfall or residual risk is a random variable equal to ðÀqðX Þ À X Þ þ ¼ maxðÀqðX Þ À X ; 0Þ. Evaluating the shortfall is clearly important, and a natural measure is
We call ESðX Þ expected shortfall. Often in the literature this name is employed when qðX Þ ¼ VaR a , and P is an expectation [6] -in this case ES gives an answer to bullet (a) in Section 2. A further measure is
which can be termed Conditional Expected Shortfall, noting that ÀqðX Þ À X j À qðX Þ À X > 0 ¼ ðÀqðX Þ À X Þ þ j À qðX Þ À X > 0. CES measures 'how bad things will go in the average, assuming that they will go bad'. It specializes to a well known risk measure, Conditional Tail Expectation, putting q ¼ 0 and replacing P with a conditional expectation in (11) . The next proposition is useful to discuss the consistency properties of ES and CES. Proof. To prove (a), put Z ¼ ðÀqðX Þ À X Þ þ and call A the event ÀqðX Þ À X > 0, A c its negation. Then CESðX Þ ¼ P ðZjAÞ and ESðX Þ ¼ P ðZjAÞP ðAÞ þ P ðZjA c ÞP ðA c Þ ¼ P ðZjAÞP ðAÞ, since ZjA c ¼ 0jA c . The proof of (b) is trivial. As for (c), from maxðÀqðX Þ À X ; 0Þ P maxðÀX ; 0Þ P ÀX and (4) we get ESðX Þ P P ðÀX Þ. Hence ESðX Þ, as an upper prevision for ÀX, satisfies the characterization theorem for avoiding sure loss recalled in Section 3. h From (a) of the previous proposition and non-negativity of ES and CES (which is implied by (4)), we get ESðX Þ 6 CESðX Þ. The inequality is strict in practice: the case P ðÀqðX Þ À X > 0Þ ¼ 1 corresponds to our being more or less sure that the measure q is completely inadequate to protect us from shortfalls.
From (b), neither ES nor CES satisfies property (T), a necessary condition for both coherent and convex risk measures. Hence ES and CES are not convex (nor coherent) measures for X if only D is significantly large (it is sufficient that there are X ; a 6 ¼ 0 such that X ; X þ a 2 D).
It is true from (c) that ES avoids sure loss if q 6 0, but such a property is operationally rather weak: when q < 0, every X in D is deemed to be not risky at all (the amount q required to cover its losses is negative!), hence shortfall evaluations are of lesser importance.
In the more interesting case that qðX Þ > 0 for some X, ES may incur sure loss. For an extreme example, let D ¼ fX g; qðX Þ ¼ À infðX Þ. Note that q is coherent, since (cf. (7)) qðX Þ ¼ P ðÀX Þ ¼ supðÀX Þ is the vacuous upper prevision [27] for ÀX (but this choice for q only makes sense when believing that the probability of X being very close to its infimum is about 1). It follows that ðÀqðX Þ À X Þ þ ¼ 0, hence ESðX Þ ¼ 0, not surprisingly (since any shortfall is impossible in the present situation) but irrespective of X. If in particular supðX Þ < 0, it is easy to check that ESðX Þ incurs sure loss.
Similar arguments hold for CES. Therefore, ES or CES alone appear rather inconsistent as measures of risk for X. An alternative is to get a new measure using them together with measure q. Consider for instance evaluating X by means of
It is not difficult to see that:
• q T avoids sure loss when q does so;
• if q satisfies the translation invariance axiom, then q T is translation invariant iff /ðq; X þ aÞ ¼ /ðq; X Þ 8a 2 R.
Suppose /ðq; X Þ ¼ ESðX Þ or /ðq; X Þ ¼ CESðX Þ. When q is translation invariant, q T ðX Þ is also translation invariant (Proposition 3, (b)); if q avoids sure loss q T avoids sure loss too, even when ES or CES incur sure loss. However, q T does generally not inherit all of the properties of q; in particular when q is convex or coherent q T may fail to be so.
Dutch risk measures
A common way of generating an upper prevision P ðX Þ for each X 2 D is to add 'something' to a coherent prevision P ðX Þ:
Thus, bookies in principle do not accept betting prices which are fair in de Finetti's meaning, but may use the precise prevision (fair price) P ðX Þ to determine their own price P ðX Þ, choosing an appropriate, typically strictly positive /. An advantage of employing (13) is that P ðX Þ is guaranteed to avoid sure loss (by the characterization theorem in Section 3), whilst it is not necessarily coherent.
The method can be applied to risk measures, recalling that qðX Þ is an upper prevision for ÀX and getting thus q by adding 'something' to a coherent prevision P ðÀX Þ. In particular, let us focus on the family of risk measures
which we call Dutch risk measures (measures bearing this name, using an expectation E instead of the previsions P ; P 1 , were introduced in [13] ). Note that P ; P 1 can be assessed independently. This may be the case, for instance, when they are not assessed by the same person. It is of course possible to ask that P ¼ P 1 .
The choice of q c ðX Þ in (14) has something in common with the definition of q T ðX Þ in (12): if a risk measure qðX Þ ¼ P ðÀX Þ was preliminarily assessed, P 1 ½ðP ðX Þ À X Þ þ would be the corresponding ESðX Þ. But qðX Þ ¼ P ðÀX Þ is an intuitively inadequate choice, because the prevailing attention to potential losses which is typical of risk measurement makes us naturally depart from fair evaluations. And in fact q c ðX Þ is defined in (14) by adding a percentage of the prevision P 1 of ðP ðX Þ À X Þ þ ¼ ðÀP ðÀX Þ À X Þ þ to P ðÀX Þ. The prevision P 1 measures how inadequate P ðÀX Þ is to cover risks arising by possibly too low values for X.
A Dutch risk measure is coherent 3 :
Proposition 4. A risk measure q c ðÁÞ assigned by (14) on a set D of random variables is coherent on D.
Proof. Let us extend q c ðÁÞ on some linear space L containing real constants as well as D and the domains of P and P 1 . We can do that, since q c is defined by means of coherent (precise) previsions, which can be coherently extended on any superset of their domains (extension theorem, cf. Section 3). It suffices then to verify that the axioms in Definition 2 hold for q c ðÁÞ on L. Then q c ðÁÞ is coherent on L and hence also on D.
Checking axioms (T) (translation invariance) and (PH) (positive homogeneity) is not difficult and is omitted.
Axiom (S) (subadditivity) ensues from (4) and (5) and property ðf þ gÞ þ 6 f þ þ g þ as follows:
To check (M) (monotonicity), assume X 6 Y (therefore P ðX Þ 6 P ðY Þ). We have to prove that q c ðY Þ 6 q c ðX Þ. Using the assumptions, (4) and (5) and property ðP ðZÞ À ZÞ þ À P ðZÞ ¼ maxðÀP ðZÞ; ÀZÞ, we get:
This completes the proof. h Dutch risk measures can be further generalized, replacing P 1 with an upper prevision and P with a risk measure. This is done in [3] , where their properties and insurance pricing implications are investigated.
Conditional risk measures
Conditional expectations or previsions appear in several risk measures, like CES or other ones, devised to evaluate unconditional random variables. A more general problem is that of evaluating risks when the set D is formed by conditional random variables of the kind X jB, where the set of conditioning events is again arbitrary, with the only restriction that every B is a non-impossible event (while some B may be equal to X, that is, unconditional random variables may be included into D as well). Note that this kind of problem may arise naturally in a number of situations, including the case of an unconditional risk evaluation on which some conditioning is performed at a later stage.
We focus here on the possibility of generalizing convexity and C-convexity to the conditional case. The problem was investigated in [21, 22] , where conditional convex previsions were introduced and their properties were studied.
From now on the same symbol may denote either an event or its indicator function. The definition of conditional convex lower prevision, generalising Definition 6, is:
Definition 9. Let D be a set of conditional random variables. P : D7 !R is a convex conditional lower prevision on D if and only if, for all n 2 N þ , 8X 0 jB 0 ; . . . ; X n jB n 2 D, 8s 1 ; . . . ; s n real and non-negative such that
. . . ; ng, it holds that supfGjSðs 1 ; . . . ; s n Þ _ B 0 g P 0.
When omitting the convexity condition in this definition, we obtain, in a slightly more general version, the definition of coherent lower prevision due to Williams [30] . This implies that a theory for coherent risk measures in a conditional framework is already at hand, as a special case of convexity. It has to be remarked, however, that also other (less general) concepts of coherence were suggested in the conditional case [27] . Thus, the point with coherence when conditioning is not really that of how to generalise coherent risk measures there, but rather of choosing an appropriate definition of coherence. When emphasizing generality, some version of Williams' coherence seems appropriate.
Returning to convexity, it is possible to derive a generalisation of Theorem 1 [21] :
Theorem 3. Let X be a linear space of bounded random variables, E & X the set of all indicator functions of events in X. Let also 1 2 E and BX 2 X, 8B 2 E, 8X 2 X.
convex conditional lower prevision if and only if all the following conditions hold:
ðD1Þ P ðX jBÞ À P ðY jBÞ 6 supfX À Y jBg; 8X ; Y 2 X, 8B 2 E £ . ðD2Þ P ðkX þ ð1 À kÞY jBÞ P kP ðX jBÞ þ ð1 À kÞP ðY jBÞ; 8X ; Y 2 X, 8B 2 E £ , k 2 ð0; 1Þ. ðD3Þ P ðAðX À P ðX jA^BÞÞjBÞ ¼ 0; 8X 2 X, 8A; B 2 E £ : A^B 6 ¼ £.
Condition (D3) in this theorem is especially interesting, since it is (a general version of) what was called in [27] the Generalised Bayes Rule (GBR). The GBR therefore holds also outside coherence. As for (D1), it implies axiom (T) in Theorem 1, or also, in the language of risk measures, the translation invariance axiom in Definition 2. This axiom can however be justified autonomously, showing that it is necessary to allow the operational meaning of risk measures recalled in Section 2.
Also in the conditional case, the class of centered previsions has more satisfactory consistency requirements (this is not patent from Theorem 3, cf. [21] for details). The generalisation of the centering condition which proves to be sound is:
Definition 10. P : D ! R is a centered (conditional) lower prevision if, 8X jB 2 D, 0jB 2 D and P ð0jBÞ ¼ 0. 4 The assumptions imply that if A and B 2 E then A^B and A _ B 2 E.
Fundamental notions of imprecise probability theory in risk measurement
In this section, we discuss the application and extension of some basic notions from imprecise probability theory to risk measurement.
Natural extension
First we consider the concept of natural extension which, as well known [27] , allows extending any coherent imprecise prevision on D onto any superset D 0 ' D and correcting any prevision that avoids sure loss into a coherent one, the correction being least-committal, i.e. the natural extension E of an upper prevision P is such that EðX Þ 6 P ðX Þ; 8X 2 D and that every coherent P Ã 6 P is such that P Ã 6 E. The natural extension can be applied in risk measurement:
• to extend a coherent risk measure on any superset;
• to correct a risk measure which is not coherent but avoids sure loss into a coherent risk measure.
However, there might be some practical constraints which prevent us from applying the natural extension. In fact, using (7) we get EðÀX Þ 6 qðX Þ; 8X 2 D (in this case we say that q dominates E). This means that the natural extension is less prudential than q, that is it requires allocating a smaller amount of money than q to cover the same risks (its being least-committal guarantees at any rate that it is the most prudential among the coherent corrections of q which are less prudential than q itself). Using the natural extension might be questioned by some authorities (or regulators) who would rather prefer a correction more prudential than q, that is a correction ensuring a higher risk protection than q. A solution to this problem is to perform the correction of q in the opposite direction, i.e. to find some upper extension U such that: U ðX Þ P qðX Þ, U is coherent and is in some sense an optimal correction among the coherent risk measures that dominate q. It is shown in [19] that this problem can be solved, under mild restrictions, by resorting to some concepts developed in [29] and extending a result proved there.
Another point is that the natural extension cannot be applied to correct previsions or risk measures which do not avoid sure loss, since it is infinite in this case [27] . With respect to this, a similar concept arising from the theory of convex previsions, the convex natural extension, can be helpful.
Definition 11. Let P : D7 !R be a lower prevision, Z an arbitrary bounded random variable. Define
LðZÞ ¼ a : Z À a P P n i¼1 g i ; for some n P 1; X i 2 D; s i P 0; with
The definition differs formally from that of the natural extension in [27] only because of the additional convexity constraint P n i¼1 s i ¼ 1, and the properties are similar. For instance, a lower prevision is convex (coherent) on D iff it coincides there with its convex natural extension (with its natural extension); hence the convex natural extension characterises convexity, in the same way as the natural extension characterises coherence. Further, the convex natural extension is least-committal among convex previsions.
With respect to the correction problem, it can be proved that:
Proposition 5. E c ðZÞ is finite for all Z iff P avoids unbounded sure loss.
The just mentioned condition of avoiding unbounded sure loss is defined as follows:
Definition 12. P : D 7 ! R is a lower prevision that avoids unbounded sure loss on D iff there exists k 2 R such that, for all n 2 N þ , 8 X 1 ; . . . ; X n 2 D, 8 s 1 ; . . . ; s n P 0 with P n i¼1 s i ¼ 1, it holds that sup P n i¼1 s i Á ðX i À P ðX i ÞÞ P k.
This condition is quite unsatisfactory as a rationality requirement, but is rather mild and considerably larger than avoiding sure loss (for instance, it always holds when D is finite). Therefore it allows using the convex natural extension for performing corrections in cases where the natural extension would not be applicable.
The concept of convex natural extension was generalised to C-convex conditional previsions in [21] .
A different, little investigated question concerns techniques for operationally checking consistency and possibly correcting risk measures for simple random variables. Among various possibilities, a promising approach is that of adapting ideas developed in [28] , but further work is needed in this area.
Envelope theorems
The envelope theorem is another important issue in the theory of imprecise previsions ( [27] , Section 3. 3.3(b) ). It says that a lower prevision P is coherent on D if and only if there exists a (non-empty) set P of coherent precise previsions such that
(inf is attained: for every X 2 D, there is some P 2 P such that P ðX Þ ¼ P ðX Þ). For the version with upper previsions, replace P , inf with P , sup. The envelope theorem relates the indirect approach to coherent imprecise previsions, defining them in terms of other uncertainty measures (infima or suprema of sets of precise previsions), to the direct one, which gives a definition corresponding to a direct behavioural interpretation in certain betting schemes. Another very important feature of the envelope theorem is that it points out a way of assessing imprecise previsions, which is often applied in practice. Instances of envelope-like theorems appear also in many other different areas, like for instance convex analysis [23] .
In risk measurement, an envelope theorem is mentioned, for instance, in [2, 5] . This theorem is a special case of the envelope theorem recalled above, because there D is a linear space L, and P is a set of expectations, each derived from a precise r-additive probability. Each expectation on L is called scenario. Observe (cf. Section 3) that assessing a precise prevision on D does not imply assessing also a precise probability (to be used to compute an expectation which coincides with the prevision), nor must the probability be r-additive. When each scenario is assessed by an expert, for instance, the expert need not assign preliminarily a precise probability.
Summing up, a broader envelope theorem for coherent risk measures, corresponding to that in [27] , may be stated as follows: Theorem 4. P is convex on D iff there exist a set P of coherent precise previsions on D and a function a : P ! R such that:
Moreover, P is C-convex iff (0 2 D and) both (a) and the following (b) hold:
(inf is attained and may be replaced by min in both (a) and (b)).
The customary envelope theorem for coherent lower previsions is a special case of Theorem 4, with a 0. When the envelope theorem is used for deriving a subject's assessment from evaluations by a group of experts, each assessing a precise prevision, function a may be interpreted as a correction the subject applies to each expert's opinion.
It is also possible to derive envelope theorems for conditional lower previsions [22] . The matter is more complicated, especially because conditioning events are allowed to (possibly) have zero probability. The simplest theorem, working when no zero probabilities are involved, is the following one: 5 We report the theorem as stated in [20] . Versions of this theorem appeared also in [10] . Theorem 5. Let B ¼ fB : 9X jB 2 Dg, P be a set of coherent precise previsions on D [ B such that 8P 2 P, P ðBÞ > 0 8B 2 B, and let a : P ! R be a real function. Then
is a convex conditional lower prevision on D, for B 2 B such that the infimum in (17) is finite for all X jB 2 D. Further, P defined by (17) is centered iff inf P 2P
Note that Theorem 5 is not a characterization theorem, unlike Theorem 4. Other envelope theorems are stated in [22] .
Dilation
There is another issue to mention for its relevance in risk measurement, and this is dilation, studied in [25] . Suppose that X is conditioned on each of the non-impossible events of a given partition P, let B be one of them. Roughly speaking, dilation occurs when the uncertainty evaluation on X jB is vaguer than the evaluation on X, whatever is B 2 P. The case when both lower and upper previsions are assessed is particularly meaningful, since then there is strict dilation [25] when P ðX jBÞ < P ðX Þ 6 P ðX Þ < P ðX jBÞ 8B 2 P ð18Þ
and we say that P dilates strictly X, while P dilates X when one of the strict inequalities in (18) may be replaced by a weak inequality. Assuming as usual P ðX jBÞ ¼ ÀP ðÀX jBÞ, which specialises to (6) when B ¼ X, strict dilation can be discussed also referring to lower or alternatively upper previsions only. This is the case of risk measures, where (18) is written as follows:
qðX jBÞ > qðX Þ; qðÀX jBÞ > qðÀX Þ 8B 2 P: ð19Þ
In words, strict dilation implies that the money an investor should reserve to cover risks from his holding either X or ÀX must be increased when assuming that B will be true, no matter which B 2 P is chosen. Since one B 2 P is certainly true, the reserve money should be raised in all cases. This is disturbing, and a possible way-out is to observe that the argument is conditioned on the given partition. Hence changing the partition does not imply that dilation will still occur, and a well-chosen partition might let us avoid dilation in certain problems. Dilation was shown in [25] to be a relatively common phenomenon with coherent imprecise probabilities, and results in [25] can be extended to convex previsions (and hence to convex risk measures, cf. [22] ). This is one of the topics in applying imprecise previsions to risk measurement which require further investigation, but cannot anyway be neglected when considering risk measures for conditional risks.
Conclusions
It has been shown in this paper that imprecise prevision theory can be quite naturally applied to risk measurement, supplying general methods for constructing, evaluating and correcting risk measures. Basic concepts from this theory have interesting interpretations in a risk measurement environment. There are also feed-backs in the converse direction: for instance, a primary motivation for studying the concept of convex imprecise prevision in [20] was the need in risk measurement to get a class of measures broader than coherent risk measures, but retaining a good part of their properties.
To conclude, a brief note on references. The literature on financial risk measurement is quite large. Risk measures have been related to several theoretical and practical issues which could not be discussed here, like for instance correspondences between risk measures and stochastic orderings or comonotonicity (cf. [6] and the book [9] ). A good all-purpose (or nearly) reference is currently the web site www.gloriamundi.org, the secondary title of which is All about Value-at-Risk. Although the promise is untenable, this site is actually an excellent starting point for getting material on many other risk measurement topics. It can be used, for instance, to trace papers on special cases of coherent risk measures or anyway on other risk measures not mentioned here, like Conditional Value-at-Risk [24] . Essential ideas on the (traditional) approach to ADEH-coherent risk measures may be found in [1, 2, 5] . Refs. [15, 16] are among the papers discussing further aspects of ADEH-coherent risk measures, motivations for adopting them, and related topics. FS-convex risk measures were introduced and studied in [10, 11] , and also in [12] . There is much less literature on the relationship between risk measures and imprecise probabilities. A good part of this paper is based on [19] [20] [21] [22] , while the basic concepts about imprecise previsions, assumed known and recalled only in passing here, are those of [27] . For a different unifying approach to risk measures, imprecise probabilities, and other concepts, see [17] . In a sense, convex risk measures are bounded rationality models (when viewed from coherence); for other alternatives to coherence, see [18] and [27] , Appendix B, and, for a discussion, [21] , Section 3.4.
